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REFLECTIONS ON URBAN SPRAWL, SMART GROWTH, AND
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
t
TrMoTHYJ. DOWLING
The purpose of this essay is modest and twofold. First, I hope to
show that the policy debate regarding whether urban sprawl is a seri-
ous problem should be over and largely is over. Legitimate disagree-
ment exists regarding the cure and the proper roles of federal, state,
and local governments in addressing sprawl, but it is no longer rea-
sonable to deny sprawl's existence.
Second, I argue that efforts to combat sprawl are entirely consis-
tent with longstanding traditions regarding appropriate regulation of
land use, as well as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
Those who argue that courts should constrain smart growth initiatives
through an activist application of the Takings Clause threaten not
only our constitutional structure, but also the very property rights they
purport to champion.
I. MUCH ADo ABOUT NOTHING?
G.K. Chesterton once observed that it is sometimes difficult to de-
fend a proposition of which you are entirely convinced. If you were
asked, for example, why civilization is preferable to savagery, you
might look wildly around, pointing at object after object, and frantic-
ally but vaguely respond: "Why, there is that bookcase.., and pi-
anos ... and policemen."2 In Chesterton's words, the "very multiplic-
ity of proof which ought to make reply overwhelming makes reply
impossible."3
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
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The sprawl debate sometimes suffers from the difficulty of proving
the obvious. When skeptics suggest that concerns about sprawl are
largely dust and nonsense, it is hard to know where to begin. The de-
bate sometimes lacks precision because urban sprawl threatens so
much: quality of life (particularly in our poorest neighborhoods),
prime farmland, the environment, our historic and cultural heritage,
and our sense of community.
Because sprawl's harmful effects are all-pervasive, there is a danger
of forgetting what life was like without it. Over time, we might un-
thinkingly come to accept a ninety-minute daily commute, a smoggy
horizon, lifeless central cities, and bloated property taxes as the natu-
ral order of things. Like the skeptical fish that questions whether
there is any water in the tank, skeptics try to use sprawl's very perva-
siveness to their advantage.4
Sprawl unquestionably has an I-know-it-when-I-see-it quality to it.
5
As with pornography, however, the difficulty in defining urban sprawl
is no argument against attempting to control it. As we work to find
solutions, a common definition is emerging-a definition that focuses
the debate on low-density, land-consuming, automobile-dependent,
haphazard, non-contiguous (or "leapfrog") development on the
fringe of settled areas, often near a deteriorating central city or town,
6that intrudes into rural or other undeveloped areas.
The problem is not growth per se, but dysfunctional growth. The
solution is not no growth, but smart growth achieved by directing de-
velopment back to central cities and other areas that yield sustainable
communities. Tax incentives, brownfield redevelopment, elimination
of sprawl-enhancing subsidies, urban growth boundaries, transferable
4 See Bill Bishop, Urban Sprawl Makes Comeback, LEXINGTON-HERAL-LEADER, Mar.
14, 1999, at Fl ("Sprawl doesn't hurt anybody.... [It] is the American dream.").
5 See Richard Moe, The Sprawling of America: Federal Policy Is Part of the Prob-
lem; Can It Be Part of the Solution?, Address Before the National Press Club (Jan. 22,
1999), in National Trust for Historic Preservation (visited Nov. 6, 1999)
<www.nthp.org/main/abouttrust/sprawling.htm> (stating that sprawl "reminds me of
Justice Stewart's remark about pornography: It's hard to define, but you know it when
you see it").
6 See, e.g., NATIONAL AW5'N OF LOCAL GOV'T ENvTL. PROF'LS, PROFILES OF BUSINESS
LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWTH: NEW PARTNERSHIPS DEMONSTRATE THE ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF REDUCING SPRAWL 8 (1999) [hereinafter BUSINESS LEADERSHIP ON SMART
GROWTH] (defining sprawl as "low-density, discontinuous, automobile-dependent, new
development on the fringe of settled areas"); TRANSIT Coop. REsEARCH PROGRAM,
REPORT 39: THE COSTS OF SPRAwL-REVISITED 6-8 (1998) (offering a multifaceted
definition of sprawl which focuses on low density, noncontiguous or leapfrog devel-
opment patterns, consumption of ex-urban lands, reliance on the automobile, and the
lack of integrated land-use planning).
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development rights, and many other initiatives comprise the smart
growth agenda.
Evidence of sprawl surrounds us. For years, sprawl consumed
nearly six million acres of farmland annually,7 and we continue to lose
an estimated one million acres each year.8 In central California,
sprawl threatens to destroy more than 3.6 million acres of our most
productive farmland in the first half of this century.9 According to the
American Farmland Trust, 80% of our fruits, vegetables, and dairy
products are "in the path of sprawling development.
Sprawl leads to excessive dependence on automobiles, which im-
poses enormous costs and degrades our quality of life. The average
daily round-trip commute for workers in Atlanta is 36.5 miles." The
average speed on Los Angeles freeways is expected to fall to eleven
miles per hour during the next decade. 2 In Washington, D.C., area
residents waste about seventy-six hours each year in traffic jams at a
cost of about $1260 per person.' s Nationwide, the price tag for lost
time and fuel due to sprawl-exacerbated congestion is $72 billion per
year.'4 This congestion is literally driving us crazy, with steadily in-
creasing road-rage incidents claiming more than 200 lives in recent
15
years.
7 Seejulian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Farmland Preservation: A Vital Agricultural Issue
for the 1980's, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 443, 444 (1982) (reporting that from 1954 to 1974,
suburban growth replaced about 119 million acres of farmland).
8 See Open Space and Environmental Quality: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env't
and Public Works, 106th Cong. 155 (1999) (statement of Ralph Grossi, President,
American Farmland Trust) [hereinafter Grossi Testimony] (noting that a 1997 American
Farmland Trust study "found that over the past decade 1,000,000 acres of farmland
were lost to urban uses each year").
9 See Moe, supra note 5 ("It's estimated that over the next 45 years, sprawl in the
Central Valley of California will affect more than 3.6 million acres of America's most
productive farmland.").
10 Grossi Testimony, supra note 8, at 155.
11 See Daniel Pedersen et al., Sprawling, Sprawling; NEIVSWEEK, July 19, 1999, at 24,
25 ("Atlantans drive 36.5 daily miles round trip to work, more than Dallas's 29.5 and
Los Angeles's 20.5.").
12 See Moe, supra note 5 (arguing that sprawl results in commuters losing valuable
time).
3 ,See Alan Sipress, No Headway in Traffic Woes, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1999, at BI
(citing a report by the Texas Transportation Institute, which ranked traffic in Washing-
ton, D.C. as the second worst nationally).
14 See id. (reporting the results of a Texas A&M study).
i5 See Alan Sipress, Death at an Alabama Exit, Road Rage Engulfs Two Women and a
Suburb, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1999, atAl (reporting that according to an AAA Founda-
tion for Traffic Safety study, road-rage incidents increased nearly sixty percent and re-
sulted in 218 deaths from 1991 to 1996).
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Sprawl imposes burdensome infrastructure costs. One study esti-
mates that the cost of providing services in outlying areas is at least
twice the cost of servicing new development located near existing fa-
cilities.16 In Maine, for example, the cost of education, roads, and po-
lice increased by $1300 per household during the 1980s, and sprawl
was a major contributor.
17
Try as they might, skeptics cannot credibly dismiss concerns about
sprawl as the rant of environmental extremists. Indeed, business
leaders are among the most effective voices for smart growth. Citing
the enormous costs of sprawl in California, a 1995 landmark report
sponsored by the Bank of America found that "unchecked sprawl has
shifted from an engine of California's growth to a force that now
threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life."' 8 The
report concludes that sprawl contributes to, among other ills, de-
creased employee productivity, higher business costs and taxes, and a
decreased urban tax base.' 9
Other industry executives agree. The Atlanta Chamber of Com-
merce has established a Smart Growth Partnership with the Urban
Land Institute and The Georgia Conservancy because traffic conges-
tion threatens Atlanta's economic vitality.0 In Silicon Valley, industry
leaders are promoting smart growth to attract highly skilled workers to
leading high-tech companies.2' Business executives in northwest
Michigan are pursuing smart growth to preserve the natural environ-
16 See ROBERT H. FREILIcH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SuccEssFuL LEGAL,
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SysTEMs 23-24 (1999) (citing a recent Urban Land
Institute study).
1 See MAINE STATE PLANNING OFFICE, THE COST OF SPRAWL 10 (1997), available at
<http://www.state.me.us/spo/files/sprawl.pdf> ("Maine state and local government
spending in ... three areas alone-education, roads, and police-increased in real
dollars by $637 million during the 1980's, a total of over $1,300 per Maine house-
hold.... [I]t is beyond dispute that the spreading out of Maine families is a major con-
tributing factor to the overall increase.").
18BEYOND SPRAWL: NEW PATTERNS OF GROWTH TO FIT CALIFORNIA 1 (1995)
(sponsored by Bank of America, California Resources Agency, Greenbelt Alliance, and
the Low Income Fund).
19 See id. at 6 (cataloguing the "cost of sprawl" on taxpayers, businesses, residents of
new suburbs, residents of cities and older suburbs, farmers, and the environment).
20 See BUSINESS LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWTH, supra note 6, at 13-14 ("The
Chamber [of Commerce] recently formed a Smart Growth Partnership with the local
district council of the Urban Land Institute and The Georgia Conservancy to promote
smart growth, and it continues to advocate a more balanced transportation system in
the region.").
21 See id. at 14-15 (noting the use of smart growth initiatives "to preserve the re-
gion's quality of life").
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ment and to protect the area's tourism industry.3
The people who live with sprawl every day recognize it as a serious
failure of public policy. Nationwide polls show strong public support
for the protection of open space.23 In 1998, voters weighed in on
more than 240 ballot initiatives designed to control sprawl, and they
approved more than 70% of them2 In one of the fastest growing
counties in the nation, smart growth candidates recently prevailed in
every contested county supervisor race.3 Thirty-four governors hailed
open space protection and other smart growth initiatives in their 1998
inaugural or "state of the state" addresses.6 In the Commonwealth of
Virginia, hardly a hotbed of radical activism, most people believe ur-
ban sprawl is destroying their cultural heritage and quality of life, and
about 70% favor smart growth.27
Skeptics respond that only a small percentage of the United States
is developed. With so much open space available, they contend, the
anti-sprawl movement must perforce be a subterfuge to expand gov-
281ernment power at the expense of individual freedom. Those who
make this argument would have more credibility if they resided in
Death Valley or the other vast, uninhabitable terrain they include in
their calculation.
More to the point, our concentrated population patterns cannot
See id. at 14 (reporting on the launch of a land use management campaign "to
promote alternative patterns of development").
See Polls Show Strong Support for Open Space, ENvIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK, July
23, 1999 <http://www.enn.com/news/enn-stories/1999/07/072399/untzpol_4527.
asp> (stating that many Americans ranked the conservation of parks and open space
"above other major congressional priorities [in 1999]").
24 See BUSINESS LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWiH, supra note 6, at 10.
See Alan Sipress, N. Va.'s Message: Slow Development, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at
Al (reporting that in Loudoun County, which is absorbing about 1000 new residents
every month, a slate of eight anti-sprawl candidates prevailed in every contested county
supervisor race by "tapping popular frustration over roads increasingly glutted with
traffic, schools spilling into makeshift classrooms and the relentless harvest of new
subdivisions").
26 SeeBusINFSS LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWTiH, supra note 6, at 10.
27 See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, CHALLENGING SPRAWL:
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (Constance E. Beaumont ed.,
1999) (stating that aJanuary 1999 poll indicates that "70 percent of Republicans, and
68 percent of Democrats, in Virginia want to see growth and development better man-
aged," and that "[56] percent of Virginia's voters believe that the Commonwealth's
heritage and quality of life have become 'a casualty to homogenized growth'" (citation
omitted)).
28 Steven Hayward, Suburban Legends, NAT'L REV., Mar. 22, 1999, at 35 ("[T]he
threat of sprawl is vastly overblown.... Developed land accounts for less than 5 per-
cent of the total land area in the continental United States.").
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plausibly be used to justify the unplanned, myopic growth that is de-
stroying our central cities, prime farmland, and environment. The
macro-statistics used by opponents of smart growth gloss over distinc-
tions between the quality of the land we are losing and the land that
remains. To be sure, we can convert some forestland and rangeland
to cropland, but the highly productive, prime farmland we are losing
today will be gone forever.2 The same holds true for environmentally
sensitive land that falls victim to sprawl.
Skeptics also argue that the market is self-correcting because peri-
ods of great open space loss are sometimes followed by a period of re-
duced loss.s° Recently released statistics show just the opposite, with
almost sixteen million acres of forest, cropland, and open space on
private land lost to development from 1992 to 1997, more than dou-
ble the annual loss rate experienced from 1982 to 1992.s' Moreover,
even if accurate in isolated locations, this argument disregards the ob-
vious truth that the rate of open space loss sometimes decreases in par-
ticular areas because once open space is lost, there is less to lose. To
cite but one example, California has lost ninety percent of its original
wetlands and ninety-five percent of its coastal wetlands.32 That the rateof wetlands and open space loss might be falling in certain areas is not
29 See Grossi Testimony, supra note 8, at 155.
The fact is that every year we continue to squander some of this nation's most
valuable farmland with the expectation that this land can be replaced with
imports, or with new technologies that promise to help maintain the produc-
tivity gains of the past half century. The reality is that we don't know whether
new technologies will keep pace.
Id; see also A. ANN SORENSEN ET AL., FARMING ON THE EDGE 2 (American Farmland
Trust 1997) (noting that of the country's 181 "Major Land Resource Areas, 70 percent
had high quality farmland in the same areas where rapid development was occur-
ring-).
. See SAMUEL R. STALEY, THE SPRAWLING OF AMERIcA: IN DEFENSE OF THE
DCNAI.4c CrIY 14-17 (Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study No. 251, 1999)
("[T]he most rapid rate of suburbanization occurred between 1920 and 1950 .... From
1970 to 1982, the median sprawl index for the nation was 5.03. By 1982 to 1992, the
national median had fallen to 2.75. Individual states experienced substantial volatility
from one period to the next." (citations omitted)).
31 See NATIONAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1997
NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY IGHLIGHTS 1 (1999) ("[F]rom 1992-97 more land
was developed (nearly 16 million acres) than during 1982-92 (more than 13 million
acres).... From 1992-97, the national rate of development more than doubled to 3
million acres per year.").
32 See California Wetlands Information System, California's Valuable Wetlands (visited
Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.ceres.ca.gov/wetlands/introduction/values.html> ("Cali-
fornia today has only 10 percent of the wetlands that existed before settlement by
Europeans.... Only 5 percent of the state's coastal wetlands remain intact.").
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necessarily cause to cheer.33
One skeptic suggests that sprawl actually enhances air quality, ar-
guing that although sprawl has increased since the 1970s, levels of
carbon monoxide, lead, and other air pollutants have fallen.' A bet-
ter example of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy is difficult to imagine,
for this reasoning attributes air quality improvements to sprawl simply
because they followed (or coincided with) sprawl, with no accounting
for the federal ban on leaded gasoline, more stringent air quality con-
trols, and the many other factors that led to those air quality im-
provements. Moreover, emissions of one key precursor to ground-
level ozone and smog, nitrogen oxide, increased 11% from 1970 to
1997,s5 and the national average ozone level increased five percent in
19 98 ss Although today's automobiles are more than 90% cleaner
than the cars of the 1970s,"7 millions of Americans still breathe un-
healthy air in part because we drive more than twice as many miles as
we did in 1970.38
33 See Lois J. Schiffer & Jeremy D. Heep, Forests, Wetlands and the Superfun& Three
Examples of Environmental Protection Promoting Jobs, 22J. CORP. L. 571, 589 (1997) ("In
California alone, according to a University of California at Berkeley study, the quantifi-
able benefits of the state's remaining 454,000 acres of wetlands are worth $10 billion
annually.").
See STALEY, supra note 30, at 50 ("Nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon mon-
oxide, and lead pollutants often associated with automobile use have fallen consistently
since the 1970s." (footnote omitted)).
35 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Air Quality and Emissions
Trends Report, 1997, Fact Sheet (EPA Doc. No. 454/R-98-016) (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd97/trendsfs.html> (stating that "while air quality has
improved for all of the 'criteria' pollutants, actual emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx)
between 1970 and 1997 increased 11 percent").
36 See The Reauthorization of the Clean Air Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on. Clean
Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub.
Works, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator,
Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter Per-
ciasepe Testimony], available in <http://www.senate.gov/-epw/epa.1014.htm> ("The
national average ozone level increased 5 percent in 1998.").
See Reducing Sulfur in Gasoline and Diesel Fuek Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. 11 (1999) (statement of Margo
Oge, Director, Office of Mobile Sources, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency) ("[T]oday's vehicles are over 90% cleaner than cars avail-
able twenty-five years ago .... ").
38 See Perciasepe Testimony, supra note 36 ("From 1970 to 1997, ... the U.S. popula-
tion has grown by 31%, and the number of miles traveled by on-road vehicles (VMT)
has increased by 127%.").
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II. Is SMART GROWTH UN-AMERICAN?
Opponents of smart growth argue that even if sprawl causes harm,
this harm simply manifests the aggregation of individual decisions
made in the marketplace. They contend that our traditions require us
to respect these individual choices because they reflect "the American
dream."
3 9
Two responses are in order. First, sprawl does not reflect choices
made in an unregulated marketplace but choices heavily influenced
by huge government subsidies that encourage sprawl. Nearly eighty-
five percent of federal transportation money "paves the way for
sprawl."40 The federal tax code, floodplain insurance subsidies, gov-
ernment funding for expansion of water and sewer facilities, federal
mortgage subsidies and guarantees, federal urban housing programs,
gasoline prices that fail to recover external costs, and other subsidies
have long skewed marketplace decisions.
Some skeptics, while candidly acknowledging the existence of pro-
sprawl subsidies, seem to suggest that smart growth advocates use
them as a fig leaf tojustify needless regulation. In fact, the bulk of the
debate centers on these subsidies. Maryland's cutting-edge smart
growth program now restricts state subsidies for roads, sewers, and
schools to areas that will support sustainable communities.4 1 Milwau-
kee is reversing the pro-sprawl effects of the federal transportation
subsidy by using that money to deconstruct a half-built section of city
highway to make room for new homes and businesses43 Many smart
39 Bishop, supra note 4, at Fl.
40 Pietro S. Nivola, Make Way for Sprawl, WASH. PosT,June 1, 1999, at Al.
41 According to a recent survey of urban historians, planners, and architects by
Professor Robert Fishman on behalf of the Fannie Mae Foundation, federal highway
subsidies and federal mortgage subsidies ranked as the top two influences on Ameri-
can cities in the past fifty years. See ROBERT FISHMAN, THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS AT
CENTURY'S END: PAST AND FUTURE INFLuENCES 2 (1999 Fannie Mae Foundation An-
nual Housing Conference Survey) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). The report concludes that "[t]he single most important 'message' of this
[survey] is the overwhelming impact of the federal government on the American me-
tropolis, especially through policies that intentionally or unintentionally promoted
suburbanization and sprawl." Id. at 3.
42 MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 5-7B-01 to 5-7B-10 (1999) (restricting
state funding for new roads, sewers, and other infrastructure to areas designated for
growth).
43 See Timothy Egan, The Freeway, Its Cost, and 2 Cities'Destinies, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
1999, at Al ("[Milwaukee] plans to use more than $20 million in Federal transporta-
tion money to tear down a half-built section of highway that was supposed to cut right
through old Milwaukee.").
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growth advocates would declare victory if we simply eliminated pro-
sprawl subsidies, or counterbalanced them with sufficient incentives
and controls to draw people back to central cities.
Second, recent research by ProfessorJohn Hart demonstrates that
land-use controls have a rich tradition in the United States.4 Colonial
land-use regulation went far beyond the control of nuisances and in-
cluded planning efforts remarkably similar to those used to combat
modem-day sprawl.4
For example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony prohibited dwellings
more than one-half mile from town meeting houses without approval
by the court. 6 Connecticut fashioned laws to address the depopula-
tion of towns. Colonial land-use controls limited not only the
amount, but also the sequence, of new development, much as modem
smart growth initiatives seek to avoid "leapfrog development."48 These
colonial regulations-"so numerous and varied, so widely distributed,
that they cannot be viewed as anomalous"49-confirm that local land-
use planning has roots deep in the American tradition.
III. Is SMART GROWTH A TAKING?
That land-use controls, including analogues to modem smart
growth initiatives, are consistent with our historical traditions does not
by itself show that they comport with the Takings Clause. To demon-
strate the constitutionality of smart growth initiatives, we need first to
examine the text, structure, and history of the Takings Clause.
The term "take" most naturally refers to an actual expropriation
of property, and thus the text of the Takings Clause does not readily
suggest application to mere restrictions on the use of property.5 The
44 SeeJohn F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significancefor Modern Takings Doc-
trine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) (noting that land use was substantially regu-
lated in colonial times).
See id. at 1253 (concluding that "[c]ontrary to the conventional image of mini-
mal land-use regulation, government in the colonial period often exerted extensive
authority over private land for purposes unrelated to avoiding nuisance," including
land-use controls related to population densities and aesthetics).
46 See id. at 1273 (describing restrictions on locations of dwellings in the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony).
47 See id. at 1275 (describing Connecticut's concern with optimizing population
densities).
48 See id. (describing controls on the sequence of development in the New Nether-
land Colony).
49 Id. at 1281.
50 See FRED BoSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAXING ISSUE 51 (1973) ("The word 'take' or-
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framers' original understanding of the Clause was consistent with this
narrow, plain meaning. Although there is some disagreement over
the framers' general views on property, there is much evidence that
they believed the Takings Clause would prohibit only actual expro-
priations of private property.51
Even Justice Scalia, generally regarded as quite sympathetic to tak-
ings claimants, recognizes that the ratifying generation (and several
succeeding generations) read the Clause as applying only to actual
dispossessions of property. Writing for the majority in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Counci4 Justice Scalia stated that "early constitutional
theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of
property at all."52 Rather, "it was generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property.., or the
functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] posses-
sion. ,' - s
Adhering to this original understanding, during the first several
decades of takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court steadfastly re-
fused to extend the Clause beyond actual expropriations or physical
occupations of property. For example, in the 1870 Legal Tender Cases,
the Court stated:
[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring only to a
direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from
the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to in-
dividuals.... [I]t is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that is
unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an
dinarily refers to the act of obtaining possession or control of property, and although
there are many other usages of the word none of them seems descriptive of govern-
mental regulation of the use of land.").
51 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) ("While the evidence of original
intent is limited, it clearly indicates that the Takings Clause was intended to apply only
to physical takings, and the early case law interpreted it and its state counterparts as
not extending to government regulations."); John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial
Judiciay Seriously: SegmentingProperty Interests andjudicial Revision. of LegislativeJudgments,
42 CATH. U. L. Rzv. 771, 776-77 (1993) (arguing that "interpreting the Takings Clause
to limit regulation appears ahistorical").
52 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (observing that the Court's modem interpreta-
tion of the Takings Clause departs from the understanding of early constitutional
theorists).
53 Id. at 1014 (citations omitted) (describing the traditionally prevailing view of the
Takings Clause prior to 1922).
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act of Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions
harsh and unjust.54
To be sure, the Supreme Court subsequently applied the Takings
Clause beyond actual expropriations, but expropriation has served as
the critical benchmark for determining whether other government
actions effect a compensable taking. In the first regulatory takings
case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court held that Pennsylvania
mining restrictions constituted an uncompensated taking of property
because they had "very nearly the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating" the coal company's support estate, which
Pennsylvania law recognized as a distinct and valuable property inter-
est. When the Court held that a government-compelled, permanent
physical occupation of property constitutes a per se taking, it did so
because such intrusions are the practical equivalent of an appropria-
tion. 6 More recently, when the Court held that government action
that deprives land of all economically viable use constitutes a per se
taking, it again used expropriation as a benchmark, emphasizing that
such action "is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation."" Elsewhere, the Court has stated that its task
in regulatory takings cases is "to distinguish the point at which regula-
tion becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropria-
tion of the property through eminent domain or physical posses-
sion.""'
Because smart growth initiatives rarely (if ever) constitute the
functional equivalent of an expropriation of property, courts consis-
tently have rejected takings challenges to efforts to control sprawl. In
the only Supreme Court case to mention sprawl, the Court gave smart
growth a ringing endorsement in the face of a takings challenge, stat-
ing that it has "long... been recognized as legitimate" for local gov-
ernments to discourage "the premature and unnecessary conversion
of open-space land to urban uses." 9 The Court also gave its imprima-
tur to efforts to protect against "air, noise and water pollution, traffic
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551-52 (1870).
55 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1992).
56 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428-31
(1982) (discussing cases in which permanent physical occupation has been held to be
a per se taking, based on the rationale that such occupation is the functional equiva-
lent of an appropriation).
5 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199
(1985).
59 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
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congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology
and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and
other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl."6 Lower courts
have been similarly accommodating toward efforts to combat sprawl."
In view of the text, structure, and history of the Takings Clause, as
well as decades of regulatory takings jurisprudence, the suggestion
that smart growth initiatives are unconstitutional requires consider-
able movement toward the absolutist notion of property rights es-
poused by Professor Richard Epstein, who would apply the Clause
broadly to invalidate myriad government actions.62 For most constitu-
tional scholars on both sides of the political spectrum, the severe con-
flict between Epstein's theories and the original understanding of the
Takings Clause is sufficient by itself to warrant rejecting those theo-
60 Id. at 261 n.8.
6 See Christensen v.Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 164-66 (9th Cir.
1993) (rejecting a takings challenge and other constitutional challenges to a zoning
agreement that "advances the policies of Yolo County to preserve prime agricultural
land and to discourage urban sprawl"); Pompa Constr. Corp. v. City of Saratoga
Springs, 706 F.2d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting a takings challenge to a zoning
ordinance designed to conserve "land by discouraging premature development and
avoid[ing] undisciplined and needless urban sprawl with its consequent municipal
headaches"); Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The past
decade has seen a growing popular acceptance of the notion that infinite uncontrolled
growth often produces the unsightly sprawl that threatens to turn every major street
into a neon commercial carnival."); Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463, 471
& n.10 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (rejecting a takings challenge to zoning designed to preserve
open space and to control urban sprawl), af/'d 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Kent Is-
landJoint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 457 & n.4, 464 (D. Md. 1978) (rejecting
takings and other challenges to land use regulation under a Maryland statute "in-
tended as a 'tool whereby design and rationality can replace ... chaotic sprawl'" (quot-
ing Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369,
1381-83 (D. Md. 1975) (rejecting takings and other challenges to a Maryland anti-
sprawl statute))); 2nd Roc-Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 731 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1999)
(rejecting takings and other constitutional challenges to efforts to address urban
sprawl that diminished the vitality of traditional city centers); Golden v. Planning Bd.
of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302-05 (N.Y. 1972) (rejecting takings and other challenges
to urbanized tier controls on the timing and sequence of development designed to
ensure the provision of adequate municipal facilities). The landmark Ramapo ruling,
viewed by many as a watershed victory for growth management and smart growth pro-
tections, has been cited with approval by dozens of courts in the past 25 years. See
FREIUCH, supra note 16, at 63-64 (describing the tremendous success that Ramapo has
had in the courts and listing specific venues in which it has been cited).
62 See RICHARD EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN x (1985) (asserting that the Takings Clause and parallel provisions "render
constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the
twentieth century zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws, transfer pay-
ments, progressive taxation").
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Nevertheless, some commentators who oppose smart growth em-
brace Epstein's radical reading of the Takings Clause. They argue
that a compensable taking occurs whenever community protections
restrict land use or reduce property value.r3 The only exception to
their proposed compensation mandate is for land-use controls that
address a nuisance.63 As ProfessorJoseph Sax has demonstrated, how-
ever, this approach conflicts with more than 150 years of Supreme
Court precedent.3 Members of the Court generally sympathetic to
takings claims, such as ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, have
joined opinions emphasizing that value loss, even severe value loss, is
inadequate to establish a taking.67 The Court also expressly has repu-
diated the notion that takings liability turns on whether the chal-
lenged government action addresses a common law nuisance.63 Al-
though controls on nuisances are immune from takings liability
because they are part of the background principles of law that inhere
Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 230 (1990) (asserting that Epstein's conclusions "are not plau-
sibly related to the original understanding of the takings clause"), and Charles Fried,
ProtectingProperty-Law and Politics, 13 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 44, 48-49 (1990) (argu-
ing that Epstein distorts both Locke's theories and the Constitution), with LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 9-6, at 606 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) ("The gaps,
flawed assumptions and argumentative ellisions in Epstein's reactionary interpretation
of the fifth amendment [are] too numerous to address fairly here ... ."), and Douglas
T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the
Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 520-28 (1998) (summarizing critiques
of E~stein's takings theories).
See STALEY, supra note 30, at 63 (urging the adoption of "[a] well-defined and
enforceable system of property rights" under which virtually any government action
that restricts property use or diminishes property value would be deemed a compensa-
ble taking).
See id. at 65 (arguing for nuisance-based standards for land-use regulation).
66 See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 76 (1995) (statement ofJoseph L. Sax, Counselor
to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of the Interior)
(concluding that throughout its history, "the views of the Court have been remarkably
consistent over many decades on a number of central points" in takingsjurisprudence,
including the proposition that not all use restrictions and value losses are compensa-
ble).
67 See Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (unanimously concluding that "our cases
have long established that mere diminution in the value of property, however serious,
is insufficient to demonstrate a taking").
63 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (rejecting a standard of tak-
ings liability based on whether the challenged government action is a common law
nuisance); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987)
(same) (citing Miller).
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in the title to all property held in the United States,69 the notion that
all other land-use restrictions are a compensable taking has no rela-
tionship to the text of the Takings Clause or our constitutional heri-
tage.
Some skeptics, however, are less constrained by the text, meaning,
and structure of the Constitution in their efforts to use the judiciary to
advance their agenda. They are candid in their call for judges to go
beyond the written law by creating new law that furthers natural rights
and conservative social policies.70 The arguments made against inap-
propriate use of the judiciary to promote liberal goals apply with equal
force to these conservative activists.
71
In addition to these conventional (and often compelling) objec-
tons to an imperial judiciary, unduly aggressive use of the Takings
Clause in the name of "property rights" confronts a truth-in-labeling
objection. Notwithstanding the rhetoric used by the so-called prop-
erty rights movement, land-use controls and other community protec-
tions enhance the property rights and property values of most Ameri-
cans. The overwhelming majority of property owners in the United
States are homeowners (more than sixty million strong), and their
property values are greatly enhanced by local zoning ordinances and
other land-use controls.n Even owners of undeveloped land are net
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992)
(holding that even land-use regulation that completely denies the owner all use and
value of the land is not a taking where it flows from "the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
shi p ).
See, e.g., William H. Mellor, The Quest for Justice: Natural Rights and the Future of
Public Interest Law (Inaugural Speech Launching the Institute for Justice, Heritage
Foundation Lecture 342, Sept. 10, 1991) (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.instituteforjustice.org/profile/speech.shtml> (defining judicial restraint
as "the notion that judges are to apply the written law and not attempt to create it,"
concluding that "judicial restraint as an end in itself gave insufficient hope for protect-
ing crucial rights," and calling for "a modern jurisprudence based on natural rights").
7 See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OP RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LEcTuREs, 1958, at 70 (1958).
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardi-
ans, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were
in charge, I would miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.
Id.
See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 203, 204, 207-08 (1995) (statement of Dr. C. Ford
Runge, Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota) (arguing that development restrictions benefit "the great majority of
homeowners").
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winners from government actions that affect property values.7 Inap-
propriate use of the Takings Clause to undermine controls on harm-
ful land use does not promote property rights generally, but rather
the rights of a select few at the expense of the majority of property
owners.74 Those advocating such an application of the Clause should
come clean and drop the property rights mantra.
CONCLUSION
Smart growth initiatives raise a number of legitimate concerns.
For example, some regulations imposed in the name of smart growth
might implicate the availability of affordable housing.75 Other initia-
tives need to be examined to ensure that in addition to preventing
sprawl, they concomitantly promote the redevelopment of central cit-
ies into livable communities that can absorb future growth.
It is too late in the day, however, to argue that urban sprawl is a
non-issue, or worse yet that it somehow reflects the American Dream.
Sprawl-promoting government subsidies and policies long have
skewed the marketplace at the expense of our natural environment,
our quality of life, and our sense of community. Unless we protect our
remaining open spaces and remake our urban centers into desirable
places to live, we can look forward to increased pollution, longer
commutes, worsening road rage, more economic depression in our
central cities, higher infrastructure costs and taxes, and further loss of
our cultural heritage and sense of community. Nothing in our Consti-
tution or traditions prevents us from making thoughtful choices about
how and where to grow. As the Supreme Court noted long ago, "we
must not forget, that the community also have rights, and that the
happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful
preservation.7 6
73 See id. at 205-07 (arguing that, in general, owners of large pieces of undeveloped
land benefit from government restrictions over time).
74 See id. at 207-08 (arguing that loosening environmental restrictions on land use
would benefit a select few, such as owners of undeveloped land, while harming the ma-
jority of homeowners who benefit from these laws).
5 Cf Todd Shields, Md. County Proposes Minimum Size for Houses, WASH. POST, Oct.
6, 1999, at BI (reporting that a proposed ban on single-family houses smaller than
2000 square feet, being considered "to curtail rapid, budget-busting residential
growth," raised serious concerns among affordable housing advocates).
76 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 86 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837).
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